TURKISH ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1919-1938)

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During First World War the Allies by four secret agreements decided how to divide the Ottoman Empire after their victory. Among these secret agreements two were concluded for the satisfaction of Italy, in fact by the Secret Treaty of London (26 April 1915), Great Britain, France and Russia assigned to Italy as her price for entering the war a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Antalya. The second secret treaty is the St. Jean de Maurrienne Agreement (17 April 1917) between Great Britain, France and Italy, it was an attempt to reconcile the conflicting claims of France and Italy. France would have Adana while Italy would be given the remainder of southern Asia Minor, including the city and vilayaet of İzmir.

These secret agreements were rendered void by the Russian Revolution. The weak Ottoman Empire was on the point of breaking at the beginning of the Twentieth century. So Western powers namely Great Britain, France, Italy and Austria conducted secret negotiations and had reached agreements in order to avoid fighting to share the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. Raymond Poincaré has called attention to four of these secret agreements:

1. An accord was signed in 1896 between Britain, Italy and Austria for the purpose of facilitating the consolidation of British interests in Egypt and those of Italy in Tripolitania.

2. Implied in the formation of the Holy Alliance in 1902 was the understanding that Italy would support the policies of Germany and Austria in the Balkans and that in turn Germany and Austria would recognize the right of Italy to invade Tripolitania.

3. In 1900 and 1902 France and Italy signed secret protocols affirming that neither had designs on the other's sphere of influence that is: Morocco for France and Tripolitania for Italy. (1)

In 1909 Italy promised that she would favorably regard Russian interests in the Straits (The Bosporus and the Dardanelles) while Russia in turn said she would favor Italian interests in Tripolitania.

After this preparation Italy attacked Tripolitania in September 1911. Some of the Turkish leaders thought an alliance with Great Britain might be a solution to stop Italy. Cavit bey one of the pro-British leaders of the Union and Progress Party proposed to Winston Churchill an Anglo-Turkish Alliance. When Churchill discussed this with Sir Edward Grey the latter pointed out that such an alliance might estrange the Italians and consequently Churchill's reply was noncommittal. After stressing British neutrality in the Italian-Turkish conflict he added that "We can not enter into new political relations".

The Turco-Italian War, coming like a thunderbol from a clear sky, had caused consternation in Istanbul. On 28 September, 1911, The Italian government had announced its intention to seize Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The war that followed was confined mostly to irregular but fierce hostilities between the Italian expeditionary armies on the one hand, and on the other hand the Turkish garrisons and Arab tribes, men under the leadership of Atatürk and Enver bey in Africa During the course of the war, Italy seized Rhodes, Patmos, and ten other Egean islands (The Dodecanesos), and, when peace was finally concluded by the treaty of Lausanne (signed at Ouchy, 18 October, 1912), Italy not only gained the African vilayets of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, but in addition acquired the right to hold the twelve islands until Turkey should have completed the evacuation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica (3).

Italy and Turkey were in opposite camps in the First World War however the troops did not fight because there was no occasion for this fight. However Italy seeing that parts of Anatolia promised to her by the secret treaty of London and the secret treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne were being allotted to Greece occupied Kuşadası, Antalya and Marmaris.

At the Peace Conference of 1919 at the secret session of 19 of May Mr.

Lloyd George accused Italian delegates Baron Sonnino and Signor Orlando for the Italian occupation of Turkish ports. Sonnino said that in order to reply to these accusations Mr. Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister must leave the meeting. Venizelos left. Baron Sonnino told that on May 6 when Italy was absent Greece was invited and the invasion plan of Izmir was approved by the High Council, but this region was given to Italy by the secret treaties of 1916 and of 1917. Italian delegate told the High Council that there were disorders and agitation in Kuşadası, Antalya and Marmaris the landing of Italian forces were to suppress these agitations.

Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked why hastily the decision to invade Izmir was given to Greece. Mr. Lloyd George answered that Turks were killing Greeks in the streets of Izmir which was a lie and a so called excuse for occupation of Western Anatolia. Italy did not participate in the decision of the High Council to give power and authority to Greece to occupy Western Anatolia. Brutality of Greeks occupying Izmir was criticized and published by Italians.

Even many Italian drawing depicted the Greek brutality. On the other hand Italian sailors helped many wounded Turkish soldiers. A typical thank you note from a Turkish lieutenant colonel was printed in the days following Izmir occupation. He said in brief that during occupation of Izmir he was seriously wounded. With seven wounds and left on the street of Kordonboyu. By chance sailors from Bilbao warships were passing by. They took him to warship to care and he was saved (4).

Italy was the most realistic country vis a vis Turkish national struggle and because of her interior situation, she did not want to take an adventure in Anatolia as Greece did so withdrew her forces from Anatolia. Instead Italy wanted to establish economic relations with the new Ankara Government.

The third member of the Entente, Italy had from the beginning of Turkey's war of Independence supported the nationalists, more or less openly by supplying them with war material. The port of Antalya (Adalia) which was under Italian occupation had become the main supply port of the Ankara Government (5).

Meanwhile the terms of the Sévres Peace Treaty gave Turkish nationalists further proof that Wilson's principles were empty words, that the Allies inten-

4. Reported in Milliyet İstiklal Savası Gazetesi /27 Haziran 1919
5. Kiloli, op. cit p. 41.
ded to dismember Turkey and Turkish nation, and that the Sultan and his govern-
ment were incapable of defending their interests. The main provisions of the
Sévres Traty were:

1. Most of the Thrace was ceded to Greece and (Smyrna-Izmir) was to be
administered by Greece for a period of five years after which time a free plebis-
cite was to be held.

2. Iraq, Syria and Arabia were separated from Turkey.

3. Turkey gave up all claims to the Aegean Islands in favour of Italy.

4. An international commission was to control the Straits. Turks were not
to be represented on this body.

5. The Sultan remained in charge of Istanbul and Turkey's remaining litto-
ral the Asiatic side of Marmara while Greece gained control of European side.

6. Most of the Turkish Army was to be disbanded and disarmed and the re-
mainin security forces would come under the control of Allied officers.

7. A tripartite agreement signed on April 20 defined three separate regions
of influence for England, France and Italy.

8. An independent state of Kurdistan was to be formed in eastern Anatolia.

9. Armenia was to be created and was to include Erzurum, Trabzon, Van
and Bitlis.

10. The capitulationa would continue and special steps were to be taken to
ensure full civil rights for minorities.

11. An international finance commission was to supervise the financial
economic and administrative policy of Turkey.

Italy also gave diplomatic support to Ankara Government. A diplomatic
representative of Ankara Government Cami bey was sent to Rome. The mem-
ers of First Grand National Assembly knew how difficult was to send a diplo-
matic representative to a country which was nominally at war with Turkey in
fact in one secret session Vehbi bey deputy from Karesi said "We were able to
send a diplomat to Rome in spite of thousand difficulties." *(6)*

Istanbul Government was invited in February 1921 to London Conference
to discussions for possible changes on Sévres Treaty. But Istanbul Government
was instructed by the Allies include some delegates from Ankara Government
in Turkish delegation to be sent. Istanbul Government transmitted this will to

*(6).* TBMM Gizli celse zabıfları, cilt 1, s. 367.
Ankara where the deputices strongly objected. They wanted separate invitation of Ankara Government by the Allies. Husrev bey deputy of Trabzon said "If we are invited, we will go our heads up" (7). Safa bey deputy from Adana said "In any case I see dangerous to send a delegation to Europe uninvited" (8). In the same discussions in the Grand National Assembly some deputies pointed out that in Italy and in France some people think and want that the peace must be with Ankara government and not with Istanbul Government. Celalettin Arif bey, deputy from Erzurum said "In recent times in Europe mostly in France and in Italy there are people who claim that these countries must come to an agreement with Ankara Government. The peace must be concluded with Ankara Government and do away with Sévres Treaty". (9).

In general, the deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly believed that Italy wanted to conclude the peace treaty with Ankara Government. Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign minister, made personal efforts to ensure that the Grand National Assembly received a separate invitation and sent an Italian warship to take them to Brindisi, from Brindisi Ankara government's delegates went Rome to talk with Count Sforza. So the friendliness of Italian Government to Ankara Government was evident. However a treaty signed between Count Sforza and Bekir Sami Bey Turkish Foreign Minister on March 12, 1921 whereby Turkey recognized preferential Italian rights in the vilayets of Antalya, Burdur, Muğla and Isparta, in return for Italy's promise of support in an eventual peace conference, was declared nul and void by Mustafa Kemal and the Grand National Assembly with the explanation that Bekir Sami had acted without the consent of Ankara Government.

Greek were defeated and Izmir recaptured after many battles. On October 11, 1922 the Mudanya Armistice was signed Italian delegate was General Monpelli, British delegate was General Harrington, French delegate General Charpy.

Turkish delegate was Ismet Pasha and the Greek delegate General Masarkis. Lausanne Peace Treaty followed the Mudanya Armistice. At Lausanne the delegation of Western Powers were confronted by a delegation of the new Turkish regime which determined to break loose from all stagnant traditions of the Ottoman Empire. The subsequently signed Lausanne Treaty is one of the foundation stones of modern Turkey's foreign relations, as well as the keystone for a new and progressive Turkish diplomacy.

(7). Ibid, 368.
(9). Ibid, p. 392 Also Yılmaz Altuğ, Türk Devrim Tarihi Dersleri (1919-1938) 7. bası 1992, s. 111-113
Turkish diplomacy at Lausanne made some use of the rivalry between the Western Power namely between Great Britain and Italy.

The victory of Turkish diplomacy is explained in the following words by a well known historian of Turkey: "The nationalists from the start limited their aim to the preservation of control and complete sovereignty only over those areas which were predominantly Turkish in character. Nationalist diplomacy used all means possible to attain these limited but almost rigid objective. Its working can be understood only by following the sequence of events from the establishment of nationalist policy in 1919 to the triumph of its diplomacy at Lausanne in 1923" (10).

In spite of closeness of diplomatic relations of Turkey-Italy during war of Independence these relations were not so cordial in the first years of the republic. An Argentine historian explains why: "Turkey's geographical position with one foot in Asia and the other in Europe straddling the Straits which join the countries of the Black Sea with the Mediterranean world makes her political situation extremely delicate. An excessive number of interests coincide at the most important crossroads and compel Turkish diplomacy to remain in continual vigilance. No one knows better than Turks themselves what dangers arise from the privileged location of their country. It is thanks to that, that the Ottoman Empire achieved the rapid development of its power, but for the same reason it died, and that city which Napoleon said was worth the world to her possessor is a jewel difficult to keep.

Turkey's problem is not that of keeping to her policy of peace, but of trying to counteract the schemes of those who may have designs on her territory. Since she has a long coastline on the Mare Internum, Turkey is also involved in the question of supremacy in the Mediterranean, another of man's great problems, which has been the cause of bloody struggles in the course of history. In the beginning Atatürk's government thought that the horizon was completely free of clouds which might presage conflict since the Great Western Powers had changed their tactics after their rough lesson in Anatolia. After all the United Kingdom and France, who were already masters of immense colonial empires, could only have been carried away by a reckless caprice in desiring to acquire more territories. They therefore began a policy of reppochement with Turkey.

However a first cloud did appear, the expansionist policy of Fascist Italy.


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Signor Benito Mussolini has been in power since 1922 with his powerfull brain and remarkable organising ability he has brought Italy a rapid rate of progress. The country was poor in raw materials and densely populated, a factor which was made more evident by the restriction of emigration and an extraordinary rise in birthrate as a result of Fascist propaganda. The Italians began to feel uncomfortable within their frontiers.

Fascism had made Italy into a military power allowing the Duce to put his expansionist policy into practice. In this, reasons of prestige for the dictator were certainly important as was the failure to fulfil, according to Italy, the promises of territories made her to persuade her to enter the war against her former allies the first demonstraion of this was the occupation of Fiume (11). When the future of the port was under discussion at Paris Peace Conference the Italian nationalist poet Gabriele d'Annunzio seized Fiume with a band of fanatics (September 1919) and defied the peacemakers until ejected in January 1921 (12).

In spite of political coolness between Turkey and Italy commercial relations improved very much. The main reason of diplomatic coolness was the dream of Mussolini to reestablish Roman Empire around the Mediterranean. Albania was under Italy's influence, her relations with Yugoslavia had deteriorated, considerably. Italy's interest in Eastern Mediterranean was a point of concern for Turkey, in 1925 in the conflict of Mosul Italy sided with United Kingdom and even there were rumors that in case of Turkish invasion of Mosul Italy would land troops to Anatolia (13).

The great depression arising from a combination of economic and political complexes which it modified beyong recognition and in some cases destroyed. The first political result of depression is to strenghten French power in Eastern and central Europe though in the long run it enabled Germany and Italy to destroy the peace settlement (14). France's temporary financial supremacy over United Kingdom and Germany's political, economic and military weakness were villy exploited. Until 1933 the only effective resistance to France was suplied by Italy, for Soviet Russia was first preccupied with pressing internal problems.

Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia were allies of France in Little Entente. Mussolini was actually attempting in 1929 and 1930 to disrupt Yugos-

Iavía by fostering Croat separatism and was deeply involved in King Alexander's murder in 1934 (18).

Mussolini also thought forming an alliance with Turkey and Greece to balance Little Entente so he maintained better relations with these two countries. The state of Turkish Greek relations did not permit the conclusion of a tripartite alliance between Italy, Turkey and Greece but Turkey and Italy signed a Treaty of Neutrality and Conciliation on May 30, 1928 (16). According Article one High Contracting parties promised not to join political and economical agreements or alliances against one of them. According Article Two if one of the High Contracting parties was is attacked by one or more states the other party promised to remain neutral. According Article Three the High Contracting parties agreed to solve their disputes with peaceful means. Following Turkish Italian Treaty of Neutrality and Conciliation on September 23, 1928 Italy concluded a similar treaty with Greece (17).

The conclusion of Turkish Italian Treaty was received with exaltation in the press of both countries. The following month Mussolini praised the pact in the following glowing words: "During the last two years; since the intrigue of elements alien to Turkey but hostile to Italy had ceased, Italo-Turkish relations have greatly improved... Italy meets Turkey in a sincere and friendly spirit. Now, one must get into habit of looking at Turkey in a new light, as a nation boldly creating a new spirit within herself after having established a new Constitution as a strong and populous nation guided by a leader whose prestige is linked with historical events of extremes importance." (18).

Mussolini as told spoke favorably of Atatürk. But Atatürk never liked or admired Mussolini as he never liked and admired Hitler and Napoleon. Prime Minister İsmet Pasha replied to the statement of Mussolini with a speech in which he said "The treaty has been a blessing for the two countries as well as for real friends of peace. I can assure you the since the signature of the treaty, this confidence has steadily increased on both sides" (19). However Italian conciliation played such an important part in the Greco-Turkish accord of 1930 that both parties thanked Italy for help (20).

15. Ibid. p. 210
16. Documents on International Affairs 1928 pp 122-123
17. Ibid 1928 pp. 148-154
18. Kılıç op. cit. p. 68
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

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İsmet İnönü Turkish Prime Minister and Mussolini praised Turco Italian rapprochement several speeches. Prime Minister İsmet Pasha said on September 13, 1928 at Malatya: "The Treaty of Neutrality and Conciliation between Turkey and Italy is worth for your special appreciation. Two countries for years suffered from the atmosphere of doubt and insecurity which was artificially created. The treaty of Neutrality and Conciliation surely saddened the international circles so called pessimists. There is no doubt that this treaty is for the good of the two countries and also for those who are sincerely for peace and security. I can say with satisfaction that the time elapsed since the conclusion of the treaty helped to increase the friendship and security" (21).

Turkish Italian Treaty was ratified on November 29, 1928 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Turkish of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü told on that occasion: as to the treaty concluded with our great neighbour in the Mediterranean this document is the factor of peace and balance this great sea which is connecting three continents of the old World and mostly at the Eastern part of it." (22)

In spite of 1928 treaty afterwards the relations between two countries were not friendly Italy was under Facsism regime which was trying to control East Mediterranean countries, Turkey was trying to unite the Balkans. This project was against the plans of Italy who was trying to detach Bulgaria from other Balkan countries. Italy subsidized both the Bulgarian government and its favoured IMRO faction in order to make trouble with Bulgaria's neighbours, and in October 1930 the Italo-Bulgarian connexion was strengthened when Boris married Princess Giovanna, daughter of Victor Emmanuel III. (23).

Turkish Prime minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Rome in 1932. This visit was prepared to solve the dispute between Turkey and Italy over Castellorizo (Meis) and some small islands close to Anatolian coast. This dispute was referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice by an Arbitration Agreement of May 30 1929. But before the Permanent Court of International Justice could take action dispute was solved by an agreement signed on January 4, 1932.

During the visit of Turkish Prime Minister and the Minisister of Foreign Affairs to Rome on May 25, 1932 the 1928 Treaty which was still in force was

23. Ibid
extended for another three years by a Protocol. According to its provisions if the Treaty was not denounced six months before the termination of three years it would be in force for another five years. But Mussolini's will of expansion in Middle East deteriorated at once Turkish Italian relations. On March 19, 1934 Mussolini at the Second Five Year Fascist Congress in a speech said that Italy's historical desires were in Asia and in Africa. This speech was received with reaction of Turkish state authorites and Turkish press. The Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Survic told Turkish Ambassador to Rome that the speech was not aimed to Turkey, that himself and Italian government never considered Turkey as Asia. On March 30, 1934 Turkish ambassador to Rome had a meeting with Mussolini who told him: "I can assure you with sincerity and definitely that I never intended Turkey and I never thought about it. If one reads my speech entirely its aim can be understood." (24) Inspite of this assurance Turkish Foreign policy was influenced. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on July 5, 1934 in his speech explained the relations of Turkish with Italy in the following words. "The main problem in our relations with Italy is a security problem. All elements are present for an entire security politically and treaty wise. The sensitiveness for peace and security is one of our characteristics this is why we are always following an open policy." (25).

Albania fell first before Italian pressure to be used by her in her Balkan politics. Italy also spread her influence in the countries which wanted revisions of the Peace Treaties, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, which were discontented with the situation in which they had remained after the war. Mussolini was dreaming of capturing a colonial empire for his country. It was rather late in the day the third decade of the twentieth century seemed illfitted to conquests since all the available territory was already occupied with the exception of Abbyssinia which though divided between zones of influences since 1906 and a member of the League of Nations since 1932 offered opportunities for conquest (26). Before opting for far-off Abbyssinia signor Mussolini loo Ked around him investigating Mare Internum of the Ancient Romans, he was seduced by the rich Anatolian coast. Those lands of Caria and Lycia whose coasts are assily seen from the Italian islands of the Dodecanese attracted him, as did Pamphylgia and Cilicia; Caria, Lycia and Pamphylia had been partly occupied by Italy after the war and had been recognised as zones of exclusively Italian influence by the treaty of Sévres. Some spying incidents showed signs that there was in investigation going on for a political and military plan for Anatolia. Turkey was immediately on her guard, and diplomatic relations became tense (27).

24. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası op. cit. p. 120
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
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The greatest worry of Turkihs stamen in the nineteen thirties arose from the aggressive policies of Bulgaria, and of Italy, whose war time designs on southern Anatolia had not been forgotten. Turkey therefore entered into a defen- sive alliance, the Balkan Entente, with Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania on February 9, 1934. The signataries undertook to preserve the Balkan frontiers and to consult together in the event of any threat to peace in their area. (29).

Italy's attack on Ethiopia on October 3, 1935 caused the application of Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations, this economic and financial sanctions were taken against Italy. Turkey noted in favour of this measure, because Italy had contravened against Article 12 of the Covenant. Italy set a protest note on November 11, 1935 to the States who had adopted the sanction. Turkey in her answer said that Turkey was not directly involved in the Italian-Ethiopian conflict, however as a member of the League of Nations which undertook formal engagements written in the Covenant she participated to the negociations in Geneva and joined the states adopting the measures, sanctions.

Turkish participation in the sanctions caused some unfavorable results for both sides in Turco-Italian commerce. Until 1934 Italy was occupying the most important place in the external commerce of Turkey. This way Turkey was showing her sincere interest for the League of Nations, Turkey was making considerable sacrifices applying the sanctions.

Italy with her note of November 11, 1935 had also threatened firstly the Mediterranean powers. England proposed in December 1935 a guaranty for Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, France and Turkey. This guaranty was an engagement of aid by England in case of attack by Italy because of sanctions (29). Spain rejected this offer but the others accepted and joined England in the Mediterranean Pact. After the ending of Italian-Ethiopian war and, termination of sanctions by the League of Nations Mediterranean Pact also ended. Italy had anneced Ethiopia.

Italy was worried about Turco-British rapprochement so in July 1937 gave to guaranty to Turkish Goberment that the Treay of 1928 was still in force and honored by Italy.

Upon Italian guaranty Turkish goverment ended British guaranty which was continuing unilaterally after the dissolution of the Mediterranean Pact Eng-

land signed a Gentleman's Agreement with Italy on January 2, 1937. Italy was guaranteeing the status quo in the Mediterranean. (30)

Turkey needed Italy's friendship because of the Alexandretta conflict between her and France. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras met with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Ciano in Milan on February 2, 1937. The talks lasted two days. The communiqué announced in the end of talks was stating that the talks were resumed in the spirit of 1928 treaty, that there was no conflict between parties and a cooperation was decided on. In the communiqué there was no mention of Italy's participation in the Montreux Convention.

The Aras-Ciano talks were favorably interpreted in Turkish press. This betterment of Italian-Turkish diplomatic relations was of a short duration. The sinking of many commercial ships in the Mediterranean by unknown submarines caused Nyon Conference. The sinking was attributed to Italian submarines (31). Some of the sinking took place very near to Turkish territorial waters. Italy, Germany and Albania did not participate in the conference which took place on September 10 and 11. Turkey supported England and France in that conference.

After Lausanne Treaty until Second World War the most important influential factor in Turkish Foreign policy was the attitudes of Italy (32). Turkey's leadership in forming the Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Pact was motivated by to counter the Italian danger in these regions. Turkey sided with democratie nations during the Second World War even was a non belligerent ally, later Turkey did join NATO and became an ally of Italy in the defense of Europe.

30. Ibid. p. 666
31. Olaylarla Türk dış Politikası, op. cit. p. 123
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.