RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE EMIGRATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1854-1862

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The pressure from the Tatars was possibly even greater since, in addition to those factors which had initially impelled them into migration, factors whose operation had not been nullified by any significant action on the part of the Russians, i.e., other than the issuing of appeals to remain, there were now two more factors: a) the nature of the Russian responses to the mass emigration, apathy, satisfaction, land-grabbing, or concern merely over a short-run labor shortage, all of which could only convince the Tatars of the correctness of their earlier assessment of the Russian attitude, and b) the fact that many now had relatives who had emigrated. For the gentry, while there was probably less than full satisfaction with the nature and scope of the governmental policies, the flurry of activity beginning in August probably had strengthened the feeling that some solution would be found. Certainly nothing had occurred to increase Tatarophilia among the gentry, or on the part of the Tsar. Accordingly, in December, orders were sent from the capital, and Stroganov then issued a circular to the effect that Tatars who wished to leave could not receive passports from the local authorities, but had to petition either him or the governor of the Crimea. This, Stroganov claimed, was to reduce misunderstanding although it may well have been intended to curb the abuses by local officials. No sale of property was permitted until the passport had been received. (Previously many Tatars, even before receiving their passports, had either ceased working their land, or had sold it in expectation of emigrating soon; when this expectation was not realized, both they and the economy suffered.) Stroganov also asserted at this time, that the Tatars were better off where they

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were. As though to reinforce Stroganov's contention, in December some of the Tatars who had emigrated, petitioned the Russian government to be allowed to return. The earlier prohibition on returnees notwithstanding, reportedly, all but a few of the petitioners were allowed to return, the only restriction on such returns being that their communes put up security for them. There are indications that the Tatars did have some negative reports on conditions in Turkey.

At the beginning of 1861, Stroganov gave permission for emigration to begin again. The level, however, was now greatly reduced, in part because of the petitions of some Tatars to return, and the presence of illegal returnees who had not been satisfied with what they found in Turkey. The ascendancy of the Tatarophobe view could be seen in the gradually toughening policy towards returnees. In June 1861, the governor of the Crimea issued orders to the local authorities to try to dissuade would-be emigrants, by pointing out that conditions in Turkey would not meet their expectations, and that many had returned; to report on all those who returned, keeping a special watch on all who had returned without passports, and to obtain

79 Markovich, loc. cit., 399-400. Again it is not altogether clear whether the authorization for renewed emigration was initiated by the capital or by Stroganov. Markovich also mentions that at the end of 1860, Flügela djutant Vasiličikov was sent to the Crimea, and succeeded in preventing the total exodus of the Tatars, but he does not elaborate, and none of the other sources mention this (Markovich, loc. cit., 403).

80 Konduradt mentions one case, the Tatars of the town of Limena, who did not emigrate in 1860 because of unfavorable reports from returnees. They decided therefore to wait for a more propitious time to emigrate, but by the time they actually decided to leave, emigration was again forbidden (presumably in 1862) (Konduradt, op. cit., I, Chast I, 145-146). Scherban' asserted that the Tatars knew, before leaving the Crimea, from the letters of others who had emigrated earlier, what conditions were like in Turkey, and so left reluctantly, motivated, he claimed, only by religious fanaticism (Scherban', loc. cit., 216, n. 1).

81 Markovich, loc. cit., 400. The renewal of permission to emigrate was greeted by the Tatars, according to a Stambult newspaper, with great enthusiasm, which manifested itself in a willingness to embark even in the winter, which greatly surprised the Russians. Rumors that the Russians would soon cut off the emigration only further accelerated the flow. The emigration of 1861 was in fact smaller, the same source continued, since far fewer Tatars remained in the Crimea. (J de CP, 3 October 1861).

82 Markovich, loc. cit., 403.
from all returnees statements as to why they had returned. In July, the Committee of Ministers, considering the question of returnees, noted that while they could be useful in making up for the ruin caused by the departures, and as a force for dissuading others from emigration, great caution must be exercised in the matter, lest «undesirables» («nezhelatel'nye») return. Accordingly, Russian representatives in the Balkans were instructed to issue passports for return only to those Tatars who had concluded agreements with Crimean landowners to settle on the lands of the latter, or to Tatars who were called back either by members of their families still in the Crimea, or by the need to settle property matters. All other cases were left to the governor's discretion. It was forbidden to settle Tatars on state land. Any Tatars who returned on their own, without having gone through channels («samovol'nos»), were to be sent back to Turkey. However, those Tatars in the Crimea who had received passports for emigration had to use them within a year, or lose the authorization to leave. From the restrictions put on returnees, it appears that the Russians felt that they had surmounted the economic difficulties created by the exodus, and so did not need the Tatars back at any cost, but would accept them back if they were willing to fill one of the less desirable slots in the economy. An oblique confirmation of this interpretation can be found in the summary report for 1861 of the governor-general, in which he stated that the exodus was continuing, not so much because of fanaticism as because relatives had already emigrated, and that the sad spectacle of the departing Tatars was being erased by new arrivals. The emigration in 1861 was estimated by one source, at the receiving end in Bulgaria, to have numbered 12,000.

It appears that from 1862 on, until the mid-1870's, there was no further sizeable emigration of Tatars from the Crimea. (The available material does not afford any precise indications on the dating or circumstances of the Russian termination of the Tatar emigration.) That the halt in emigration was the result of a Russian decision, and not merely disinclin-

83 Markевич, loc. cit., 400-401.
84 Markевич, loc. cit., 404.
85 Markевич, loc. cit., 404-405.
87 Markевич states that during 1861, emigration tapered off and gradually came to a full stop, but he does not elaborate (loc. cit., 403).
ation on the part of the Tatars, is strongly suggested by the obstacles raised by the Russian authorities to emigration of several relatively small contingents of Tatars in 1862, 1864, 1865.

From the chronological account, it will be useful, by way of summary, to turn to consideration of several general aspects of the emigration: the roles of the religious factor and Ottoman incitement in the migration, the statistics of the migration, and its economic significance for the area.

That Islamic doctrines and kinship with other Muslim peoples played a role in impelling the Tatars to migrate is to be expected. As Muslims, the Tatars may have felt some difficulty in living under a government of Christians. Among the Crimean Tatars, however, some measure of recognition of Russian power, if not reconciliation to Russian rule, clearly had taken place. In the 1820's and 30's, several persons claiming a connection with the former Tatar ruling family (the Gireyid dynasty), had come back to the Crimea; some were genuine, others frauds, but none seem to have inspired any large movement towards a national revolt. Shortly before the major

88 H.A.A., Hava (Odessa) to Ali, No. 992, 17/29 November 1862; Ali to Hava, No. 10291/29, 13 September 1864; Gilbert (Odessa) to Ali, No. 26/6, 23 January/4 February 1865; Ali to Gilbert, No. 13705/29, 27 April 1865 (and enclosed dispatches) (cf. supra, n. 49).

That the Russian policy towards Tatar emigration had geographical as well as these chronological limits is suggested by Russian responses in the latter half of 1865 to agitation for emigration among the Volga Tatars in the interior provinces (e.g., Kazan, Orenburg, Simbirsk). Among the latter, interest was expressed in pilgrimages (haj) to the holy places and in emigration to Turkey. Cf. petition of Tatars in the Simbirsk province who wanted to emigrate to Turkey for a time «to strengthen their faith» (Agrarnyi vopros i krest'ianskoe dvizhenie 50-70 kh godov XIXv., V.P. Volgin, ed., (Tatarskaya ASSR, Materialy po istorii Tatarstvitoroi poloviny XIX veka, Chast' I M. and L., 1886, 213). (The text bears the date 1862, but its explanatory heading and the other documents in the section bear the date 1865. Presumably the date given on the document is an error.)

89 Kondaraki somewhat vulgarly overstates this by saying that the Tatars could not live under a secular government because they thought they had been created to rule (op. cit., III, Chast' XIII, 139).

90 Several instances are cites by Markevich, loc. cit., 392-393, and Kondaraki, op. cit., III, Chast' X, 21. The most interesting case is that of one of the last members of the Girei family, Alexander, a nephew of the last Khan. Alexander had been taken from the Caucasus to England by British mission-
emigration of 1860, a rumor was circulating among the Tatars that the Koran called on all Muslims to unite, but the governor of the province ordered a search of the Koran for such a passage which failed to find any such.

Some of the grounds for concern on the part of the Tatars, that they were going to be forced to convert, have already been discussed. It should be kept in mind that in addition to the society for the spread of Christianity in Dagistan, mentioned above, missionary activity on a much larger scale was being carried on among the Kazan Tatars. The Crimean Tatars could not but have had some awareness of this.

There is conflicting evidence on the role of the Muslim clergy at the time of the emigrations. One source advances the simplest view, the mullas (Islamic clerics) preached in favor of the emigration, which, to some extent, probably was the case. Another source presents a more complicated picture; the clergy did not want the Tatars to emigrate, but since they were aware that the government favored the emigration, they did not speak their minds and oppose it. On the whole, it appears that those who took the view that, while religion played a role, it was a smaller role, and that the Russian mal-administration and deliberate encouragement of the emigration were more significant factors, would appear to have the stronger case.

aries. He married Admiral Nelson's daughter, and eventually, under the name Alexander Krym Girei Sultan returned to Simferopol where he died in the 1850's (ibid., 21).

91 Totleben, loc. cit., 527. Kondaraki supplies another variant of this. He says the Tatars believed there was a passage in the Koran to the effect that all Muslims had to return to that place from which they had come. He states that there was no such passage; there was, however, a proverb, "Eveve da Șam, ahir da Șam." [presumably meaning that all things must return to their point of origin. M.P.]. Kondaraki then reduces his credibility by asserting that to the best of his knowledge, the phrase was originated by Ghenghis Khan (!) (op. cit., I, Chast' I, 145-146).


94 Levitskii, loc. cit., 621-622; Goldenberg, loc. cit., 69 ff. Report of the Marshal of the Taurid nobility in September 1860, cited in Markevich, loc. cit., 402. For Sheherban's view that religion was the prime factor, mentioned above, cf. loc. cit., 216, n. 1. Markevich, despite all the evidence presented in his article, concludes by stating that there was no hostility or oppression of the Tatars by the Russian authorities, that there is no mention of any such in Russian or foreign literature on the subject; that the Russian attitude towards
Closely allied to the issue of religious feelings was that of the role of agitation by the Ottomans for emigration. On this issue, most of the Russian sources are silent (Goldenberg, Shcherban and Totlieben); one states it may have played a role (Markevich), and one (Levitskii) is quite scornful of the whole idea. One contemporary Russian source asserted that in June 1860, by which time the emigration was in full swing, many Tatar starshiny (village elders) came to Istanbul to discuss the emigration with the Ottomans, and concluded an agreement for 300,000 Tatars to come to the Ottoman Empire (in addition to those who were there already). Another contemporary claimed that before the emigration, a certain person who enjoyed great influence among the Tatars, because of his descent from the Khan, and who was hostile to the Russian administration (the source supplies no more specific indication of identity), circulated among the Tatars, urging them to emigrate. One possible but quite oblique indication of an extensive Ottoman involvement very early in the emigration venture, was the fact that most of the 310 vessels which moved the Tatars from the Crimean

the Tatars was benevolent, and the Tatars knew this to be the case. Accordingly, «religious fanaticism and nationalist tendencies» (in conjunction with «political events»), as well as ignorance on the part of the Tatar masses and the fear of having to do military service outside the Crimea, were the «main reasons» for the emigration (Markevich, loc. cit., 405). Such contradictions between the substance of an article and its formal conclusion are too common a phenomenon of Soviet historiography to require elaboration here.

95 Markevich asserts, without any documentation, that there was agitation by the Turks for all the faithful to rally around the Muslim standard (sancak-i şerif) to defeat the infidels (Markevich; loc. cit., 396). This sounds as though it pertains to the Crimean War, but comes well after his discussion of the events of that period. Levitskii, however, mentions that the Ministry of State Domains had received a report in August 1859 from the prefect of Feodosia, that Turkish clerics were in Kerch spreading proclamations in Arabic, urging the Tatars to emigrate. An investigation failed to locate anyone who had seen any such persons, and revealed that the proclamations were printed on paper made in Russia (so possibly printed by a local fanatic). It was therefore doubtful that they had been sent from Turkey. They had no real (sushchestviteli'nyi) effect on the emigration (Levitskii, loc. cit., 622).

96 «Sovremennaya letopis», «Russkii vestnik», XXVIII (1860), 372. This is mentioned by no other source, posits a number of Tatars beyond what would appear to have remained in the Crimea at the time, and so seems not fully credible.

97 Kondaraki, op. cit., III, Chast' XIII, 143. There is no indication, however, that the «person» was acting on instructions from the Ottomans.
ports during 1860 flew the Ottoman flag. This indicates some period of preparation and organization. Moreover, when one surveys the Russo-Ottoman population exchanges of the earlier nineteenth century, the state which received the immigrants and which presumably had been in contact with them before their departure, was usually the one which handled shipping arrangements and paid the transportation costs.

Several contemporary observers who were viewing matters from the vantage point of Ottoman Bulgaria were definitely of the opinion that the Ottomans had urged the Tatars to come with «sweet-sounding promises» of houses, land, livestock, seed and tax exemptions.

The statistics available for understanding the extent of the loss present somewhat of a problem, because some pertain only to the Crimean peninsula, while others pertain to the Taurid province as a whole. The entire province had a population according to the ninth census (1850) of 331,808, and according to the tenth census (1857), 340,774. A contemporary statistician indicated that in 1850, in the Taurid province there were 275,822 Tatars (including the Nogais, who at this time accounted for up to 50,000 of this figure.) If this figure was correct, and from it the 30-40,000 Tatars who left after the Crimean War are subtracted, then a later figure of 295,357 for the Muslim population (Crimean and Nogai Tatars and gypsies [sic]) of the Taurid province in 1859, while tallying with some of the other data, does appear difficult to explain. (The Nogai population

98 J. de CP, 3 October 1861.
99 Kanitz, op. cit., I, 294; S.G.B. St. Clair and C.A. Brophy, Twelve Years’ Study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria., Rev. ed. London, 1877, 167; <Cyrilles> [A. D’Avril], Voyage Sentimentale dans les Pays Slaves. Paris, 1876, 166. Levitskii mentioned that in 1859 the Ottomans had informed the Russians they could not absorb any more immigrants (loc. cit., 622). Although Levitskii’s article pertains solely to the emigration of the Crimean Tatars, this appears to be a declaration made in connection with the Circassian emigration.
100 V. M. Kabuzan, Narodonaselenie Rossii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX v. Moscow, 1963, 163.
101 Markevich, loc. cit., 390.
102 Markevich, loc. cit., 403. (Markevich’s documentation is not as clear as it might be, but he appears to have drawn this figure from an official publication of the Taurid province in 1867.) Kondaraki, who also cites this figure, but mentions only that it included Tatars and Nogais, was presumably drawing on the same source (op. cit., III, Chast’ IX, 98-99).
during the 1850’s had been variously estimated at 46-50,000.)

The problem with the 1859 figure is that the 30-40,000 lost during and after the Crimean War had been almost completely replaced by 1859, i.e., in a space of three years. One possible explanation is that the 1859 figure included also Tatars from other provinces who were in the Crimea en route to Turkey. However, for several reasons, as will be seen, a figure of 230-240,000 Tatars in the Crimea in 1859 appears most reasonable. From the available data, the number of Crimean and Nogai Tatars who emigrated between 1860 and 1862 appears to have been slightly under 200,000. Not all of these nearly 200,000 emigrants were permanently lost to the Tauridian province. Between 1861 and 1863, 10,648 passports were issued for emigrants who wished to return. The final total for the 1860 emigration (130-140,000 Crimean Tatars), when added to the figures given by most sources for the number of Tatars remaining in the Crimea after the end

103 Markovich, loc. cit., 390, 396, 403.

104 Levitski, loc. cit., 628, n. 1. Levitski’s figure comes from a table listing the number of Tatars who had received passports and had departed, who had received passports and were waiting to leave, and who were remaining (with a breakdown by district). The J de CP, in a translation of a long article on the Tatar emigration, from the Courier d’Odessa (Odesskii Vestnik) datelined 28 May/9 June, Simferopol, gave a figure of 241,082 Tatars in the Crimean peninsula (J de CP, 26 July 1860). The J de CP, gave no source, but presumably utilized this or some other Russian source, and later repeated this figure. It asserted also that the Nogais of the Tauridian province numbered 80,000 (J de CP, 3 October 1861). The latter figure seems high. Goldberg’s figure of 300,000 for the Crimean Tatar emigration (Goldenberg, loc. cit., 74) appears much too high.

105 Kondaraki gives a figure of 193,000 (op. cit., III, Chast’ IX, 99). Markovich states at one point that 192,364 exit passports were issued, of which 141,930 went to Crimean Tatars (the rest presumably to Nogais). At another point, he gives a breakdown of the emigration by occupation of Tatars who emigrated, which totals 188,563; although he claims it totals 192,360. (The latter figure is closer to yet another figure he cites, calculated in 1865, or 192,372; loc. cit., 401,463.) His erratic documentation also precludes any reconciliation of these figures. The J de CP indicated that almost all of the Nogais had left, and only about one fourth of the former Tatar population of the peninsula remained (J de CP, 3 October 1861). This would mean the 1860 Crimean Tatar emigration totaled about 180,000. This, however, seems rather high.

106 Markovich indicates that these were almost all Crimean rather than Nogai Tatars, because he subtracts from his initial figure 141,930 Crimean Tatars, and claims that only 131,282 emigrated permanently (loc. cit., 401).
of the emigration, approximately 100,000, dovetails with the figure suggested for the Tatar population just before the migration, 230-240,000\textsuperscript{107}. The total for the emigration from the Tauridian province between 1855-1862\textsuperscript{108} appears to be 210-230,000.

Certain terminological inconsistencies in some of the available statistical sources make an estimate of the loss to the area from the migration more difficult. Markevich cites Köppen's figures for the entire Tauridian province in 1837, approximately 520,000 persons, and for the Crimean peninsula in 1854, 307,807\textsuperscript{108}. An historical study of Russian demography lists the population of the Tauridian province, according to the ninth census (1850) as 331,808, and in the tenth census (1857) as 340,774\textsuperscript{109}. The population of the Tauridian province in the early 1860's was estimated variously: 1860 - 683,921, 1863 - 606,800, 1864 - 572,200 (sic)\textsuperscript{110}. It seems then almost certain that the official census figures of the 1850's for the Tauridian province did not include the continental (materikovy) areas of the province. These areas, however, were part of the province\textsuperscript{111}. One official source indicated that the population of the Crimean peninsula in 1864 was 194,300\textsuperscript{112}.

It is possible to summarize the statistical evaluation of the Tatar exodus in percentage figures. When the figures for the emigration and the population figures from the 1850's and 1860's are compared, it is apparent that the total population of the Crimea fell about forty percent, whereas the Tatar population declined by more than fifty percent\textsuperscript{113}.

\textsuperscript{107} For the number of Tatars remaining in the Crimea, cf. Markevich's figure of 102,997 (loc. cit., 403), for 1864; 100,000, for 1865, 105,587 (loc. cit., 405). According to figures published by the Tauridian province in 1864, 100,000 Tatars remained in the peninsula, and none in the continental areas. (Cf. «Tavricheskaia Guberniia» (hereafter «Tavr. Gub.»), Geograficheskio-statisticheskii slovar' rossiiskoi imperii, P. Semenov, ed., V. SPB, 1885), 5.) (The latter figure reflects the nearly total emigration of the Nogais.)

\textsuperscript{108} Markevich, loc. cit., 390.

\textsuperscript{109} Kabuzan, op. cit., 163.

\textsuperscript{110} J de CP, 26 July 1860; A. G. Rashin, Naselenie Rossii za sto let Moscov, 1866, 55; «Tavr. Gub.», 5.

\textsuperscript{111} For a listing of which areas formed the province from the time of its establishment, cf. «Tavr. Gub.», 5.

\textsuperscript{112} Spisok naselennykh mest tavricheskoj gubernii (1864), cited by «Tavr. Gub.», 5.

\textsuperscript{113} Markevich, loc. cit., 390, 403.
Another way to estimate what the departure of the Tatars meant to the peninsula is to examine what their role had been in its economy, and what their departure meant for its future. They were for the most part engaged in agriculture, particularly more intensive branches, gardening vegetables, raising fruit, and growing low grade tobacco (for personal use rather than for the market). They also worked in the salt industry, which had a long history in the Crimea.\footnote{114}

According to one estimate, the province lost at this time 85,000 workers.\footnote{115} The loss was quite severe for several reasons. For two decades, the province had already been short of labor. This shortage was made even more acute by the agricultural expansion Russia was then experiencing.\footnote{116} The Tatars had constituted the major labor force in the area.\footnote{117} (Among those who favored the emigration, this point was reversed and turned into a somewhat racist argument: Russia was in fact experiencing an economic expansion, and a major part in this would be played by the railroad. Given the fact that Tatars did not or could not work as hard as Russians, it would be impossible to entrust the building of the railroad, and the subsequent agricultural expansion to Tatar labor.)\footnote{118} Lastly, the Tatars had worked

\footnote{114}Umanets, op. cit., 181-186. Kondaraki claims that the Tatars were not attracted to grain cultivation, because of the low return, caused by the infrequent rainfall of the steppe, and because of the tithe they would have to pay on what they did produce (op. cit., III, Chast’ XIII, 145). The shift from nomadism to agriculture apparently had not been readily accepted by all. Markevich mentions that when the shift first began to take place, some of the Nogai Tatar chiefs had resented it, considering agriculture a form of servitude (loc. cit., 396).

\footnote{115}Levitskii, loc. cit., 636.

\footnote{116}Levitskii, loc. cit., 630; Markevich, loc. cit., 404.

\footnote{117}Goldenberg, loc. cit., 77; cf. also article from Odeskii Vestnik, translated in J de CP, 26 July 1860.

\footnote{118}Shcherban’, loc. cit., 212. Curiously enough, from the nature of some of the arguments they advanced, it appears that even some opponents of the emigration such as Totlieben and Goldenberg were influenced by this racist view of Tatar labor. Totlieben argued that even though the Tatars were not capable of exertions as great as those of the Russians, they were steady enough at agricultural labor. Goldenberg, accepting the notion of the inferiority of Tatar labor, contended that the expulsion of the Tatars was not an essential step for the development of the region, since there was much vacant land there (Totlieben, loc. cit., 534; Goldenber, loc. cit., 76).
unattractive areas of the province, in particular steppe land, to which it would be difficult to attract new settlers\textsuperscript{119}.

Tatar emigration did not affect equally all sectors of agriculture in the Crimea. Markevich gave a figure of 92,084 male peasants, but listed them all as state peasants which seems unlikely. Levitskii, however, indicated that 43,000 left privately owned lands, and 41,000, state lands, but that since three fourths of the Tatars had lived on privately owned lands, and one quarter on state lands, the exodus from state lands was proportionately far greater than that from private lands\textsuperscript{120}. Also, geographically, the loss of population was not spread evenly throughout the province; there was a higher incidence of emigration from the steppe and foothill areas, whereas a higher proportion remained on the southern coast and in the mountainous region\textsuperscript{121}. However, the shortage of labor already was greater in the south than in the north, and this was made all the more acute by the fact that the south had more labor-intensive crops, orchards, vineyards and vegetable gardens (as opposed to grain), for which temporary rescue measures such as importing seasonal labor from other nearby provinces were far less effective\textsuperscript{122}.

The class breakdown for those Tatars who emigrated, and were not peasants (males only), was 5127 nobles (\textit{murzas} and \textit{celebiks}) and clerics, thirteen merchants (presumably registered guild members), and 6987 petit bourgeois (\textit{meshchane})\textsuperscript{123}. Although as can be seen the number of Tatars who emigrated, who were in sectors other than agriculture, was not great, their departure had a significant effect on these other sectors. The ensuing economic dislocation was the result not so much, of sheer numbers, as of the fact that all those who left came from a relatively small area. Merchants whose trade had consisted largely of supplying industrial goods to the Tatars suffered losses\textsuperscript{124}. The Tatars had carried on much of the hauling of food, water and building supplies such as clay and sand; when they left,

\textsuperscript{119} Kondaraki, \textit{op. cit.}, III Chast' XIII, 143, 144.
\textsuperscript{120} Markevich, \textit{loc. cit.}, 403; Levitskii, \textit{loc. cit.}, 630, note. Levitskii's figures presumably referred to males only, and were derived from the figures from 1 (13) January 1861 (86,894 males), he cited earlier (\textit{loc. cit.}, 629 note).
\textsuperscript{121} Markevich, \textit{loc. cit.}, 401.
\textsuperscript{122} Levitskii, \textit{loc. cit.}, 630-631.
\textsuperscript{123} Markevich, \textit{loc. cit.}, 403.
\textsuperscript{124} Kondaraki, \textit{op. cit.}, III, Chast' XIII, 146.
many towns faced difficulties in provisioning. Some towns suffered considerable losses in tax revenue when many of their Tatar inhabitants left\textsuperscript{125}. Levitskii calculated that the annual revenue from the five major taxes paid by slightly less than 50,000 Tatar state peasants, came to about 119,000 rubles, and the annual cost of the Ministry’s bureaucracy in the Crimea was 102,489 rubles\textsuperscript{126}. The Ministry, therefore, had a powerful incentive for the role it was to play in the settlement in the Crimea of domestic and foreign colonists.

Why was the policy of encouraging emigration pursued when obviously it was to cause great dislocations, hardships and expenditures? The primary reason would appear to be Tatarophobia on the part of the Russians (the historical origins of which need not be discussed here). The troubles experienced with some of the Tatars during the Crimean War served for some Russians to reactiviate or increase these feelings, and for others, more probably, as a pretext to give vent to these feelings. It would be difficult to contend that there had been no awareness among the Russians of the magnitude of the problems the emigration would create\textsuperscript{127}.

\textsuperscript{125} Shcherban’, loc. cit., 215; Totleben, loc. cit., 534; Goldenberg, loc. cit., 76, 78.

\textsuperscript{126} Levitskii, loc. cit., 638, n. 1.

\textsuperscript{127} Cf. Totleben’s assertion, when opposing the emigration which was advocated by Murav’ev, the Minister of the Interior, that it would lead to the economic decline of the area, and Shcherban’s assertion, in favor of the emigration: let the Treasury lose a million rubles; the area will gain morally and materially (Totleben, loc. cit., 531; Shcherban’, loc. cit., 212). Tatarophobic sentiments were voiced by Shcherban’ (loc. cit., 212) and were cited by Goldenberg (loc. cit., 76).
CONCLUSION

The significance of this episode becomes clear when viewed against the background of the larger Russo-Ottoman struggle around the Black Sea. The extreme nature of the Russian policy was probably connected with the general shock which coursed through Russian society in the wake of the defeat in the Crimean War, a shock which released what were probably very deeply rooted Tatarophobe sentiments. There were of course precedents for substantial emigration of Tatars, the large numbers who had emigrated in the decade after Russian annexation, either of their own volition or at Russian urging, and the complete elimination by the Russians of the Nogai Tatars from the Bujak at the time of Napoleonic wars.

Also it seems quite possible that this expulsion was of particular significance for demographic developments in the years immediately following—although given the inaccessibility of Russian archives it is impossible to come to any final conclusion on this: it appears that while the relatively small migrations from the Caucasus after 1856 helped trigger this more substantial emigration of Tatars, the success, from the Russian point of view, of this emigration, may have contributed to the formulation and execution of the policy which produced, in the early 1860’s, the unprecedentedly large emigration from the western Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, although the struggle for the Black Sea area is usually considered in terms of the military conflict, both sides had been engaged to a considerable extent in manipulations of population, particularly in recently acquired or frontier areas. In the mid-nineteenth century, while the results of the Crimean War appeared to indicate a significant check for the Russians in the Black Sea confrontation, the demographic conflict indicates something other. The Russians had substantially reduced the Turkic element in an area in which for centuries that element had been predominant and so had paved the way for increasing the Slavic element. While the Ottomans were to settle many of the Crimean Tatars in Ottoman Bulgaria, the mere addition of several hundred thousand Tatars—and soon after, Cir-

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cassians- in the absence of any substantial expulsion of Bulgarians (which the Ottomans were either unwilling or unable to undertake), failed to produce any demographic shift in Rumili, favorable to the Ottomans, comparable to that which the exodus from the Crimea provided the Russians. Accordingly, the exodus, indicating a Russian success in the demographic conflict was perhaps a more accurate indicator of the shifting preponderance around the Black Sea than the rather ephemeral embodiments of military success in the articles of the Treaty of Paris.