FIFTY YEARS OF TURKISH - SOVIET RELATIONS (1920 - 1979)

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I

Three Periods appear distinguishable in the history of Soviet-Turkish relations. The first phase began in 1920 when Turkey and the Soviets found themselves united against the same enemy, the West, chiefly Great Britain.

Hard pressed by invasion of Anatolia Mustafa Kemal in a letter addressed to Moscow on April 26, 1920 declared his readiness to participate in the struggle against foreign imperialism which threatened both countries and urged to conclude a treaty of military and political alliance, however, the Bolsheviks, felt that permanent alliance with non-Communist states were a dangerous liability and instead entered into diplomatic relations with Mustafa Kemal’s Ankara Government in 1920 and on March 16, 1921, the two countries signed a treaty in Moscow settling the border disputes; the provinces of Kars and Ardahan were left to Turkey and Batum to Russia.

As a result of these agreements the Soviets supplied Turkey with weapons and ammunition. On December 13, 1921 Michail Frunze then Commander in chief of the Soviet forces in the Ukraine and later Trotsky’s successor as Commissar of war, arrived in Ankara where he was received with extraordinary warmth and friendship. Shortly after Frunze’s departure, Aralov the new Soviet envoy came to Turkey. He was welcomed by the population, visited the front with Kemal Paşa, and addressed the soldiers. Kemal began to advance rapidly during the summer of 1922. As each victory became known, Moscow sent a congratulatory telegram.
The Turkish War of Independence came to a close by the armistice signed at Mudania on October 11, 1922. It was clear to the allies that a victorious Turkey would reject the treaty of Sevres. Accordingly Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Georgia and Turkey agreed to hold a Conference at Lausanne. The Soviet Union was invited only after Moscow’s sharp protests against its exclusion from deliberations on a subject of vital interest to it. Even so its participation was limited to discussions affecting the future of the Straits and of Constantinople.

Before the Bolshevik Revolution, the relations between Russia and Turkey represented an almost unbroken tradition of enmity, due in great measure to the Tzarist designs on Constantinople and Turkish straits. Thirteen Russo-Turkish armed conflicts over the past centuries had generated a large measure of hostility. For political and economic motives, often hidden under the cover of Pan-Slavic Idealism, Russia desired “closed straits” when she was weak or needed the support of Turkey, but set her heart on “open straits” and did not hesitate to antagonize Turkey when she felt more conscious of her power.

During the First World War, France and England depended on Russian military efforts while Sazonov, the then Russian Foreign Minister, felt that Turkey’s position as an all of the Central Powers gave him the moral right to demand the cession of Constantinople and the straits to the Russian Empire and obtained it by a secret agreement.

When the Tzar addicated and was supplanted by the Provisional Government, Miliukov, the new Foreign Minister denied that the Russian Republic would surrender any of the privileges granted it by the secret agreement with Britain and France with respect to Constantinople and the straits. The overthrow of Kerensky regime by the Bolsheviks scrapped all these secret understandings. “Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Moslems” said a proclamation issued over the signatures of Lenin and Stalin on December 7, 1917.

Foreign relations are never static. They depend to great extent on geography but very much on modified rations of military strength.
and on new conceptions of the nature of "the life interests" of a country. Nicholas II wished to secure for his fleet free passage through the Dardanelles for purposes which can have been only agressive. The Communists wanted to close the straits to prevent aggression by others. As a measure against Tzarist expansion Great Britain, and other powers too, had wished to close the straits to Russia.

Now when Russia was unable and unwilling to expand, they advocated "open straits". Lord Curzon in fact admitted at the Lausanne Conference that the Respective policies of Europe and, Russia had how been reversed. The classic struggle between Chicherin and Curzon took place at the Lausanne Conference which met in 1922-23. The Russians now became" more Turkish than the Turks" and Chicherin, actually defended Turkish Sovereignty over the Straits with great zeal.

The only guarantee of the safety of the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Ukraine was the closing of the Straits. Chicherin accordingly informed the territorial and military commission of the Lausanne Conference on December 4, 1922 that in Soviet Russia's opinion, The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be permanently opinion both in peace and in war to warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey. The chief Bolshevik delegate contended that the closing of the Straits would grant equality to all nations, whereas the opening of the Straits to warships would confer a preponderant position on the strongest sea power. Russia, he declared, had liberated all the States of Mediterranean from the threat of the century-old ambitions of Tzarism. "Peace" Chicherin propounded, is consolidated by the separation of conflicting forces. Russia is ready to undertake of her Own "free will" not to send her Black Sea Fleet into the Mediterranean. By converting the Straits into a strong military barrier between Russia and England which Russia promised to respect, the cause of peace would be served. In the present situation the only possible compromise between the conflicting interest was for Turkey as sovereign, to close the straits to all warships.

The Treaty was finally signed by all the Allied Powers and Turkey in Lausanne on July 24, 1923. Jordansky, the Soviet represen-
tative, appended his signature on behalf of the Soviet Republics on August 14, 1923, in Rome. In time of peace complete freedom of navigation was stipulated. But no single foreign power could send into the Black Sea (Soviet Russia). In time of war not involving Turkey, warships and commercial vessels would be allowed to pass. The Straits, according to the Convention of Lausanne, were demilitarized. The Turkish Government nevertheless was authorized to maintain a garrison of 12,000 men in the neighborhood of Istanbul as well as an arsenal and naval base. A commission consisting of representative of the signatory powers would supervise the regime thus provided for. Hard circumstances compelled Ankara to sign. Russia subscribed to the Convention partly because this would be the first international instrument to bear her name and would thus give her recognized political status in world politics. Yet the Soviet Government refused in the end to join the International Commission or to ratify the Lausanne Straits Convention.

But Mustafa Kemal never swerved from his aim; Turkey was to become a Western State, a European State, France and Britain were his model, not Russia. But there was no change in Turkey’s external policy. The two countries were brought even closer together by “the question of Mosul.” At the Lausanne Conference Ismet Inönü had fought hard and long for possession of this former Ottoman province. But Curzon had insisted that Mosul belonged to Iraq. The treaty of Lausanne left the destinies of Mosul to be settled by Turco-British discussions. As no agreement could be reached, within the stipulated nine months, the question was referred to the Council of the League of Nations which decided (16 December 1925) to attach the disputed territory to Iraq. The Turks on the very next day signed with Soviets a treaty of neutrality and friendship which was renewed in 1929 and again in 1931, and extended for ten years in 1935. On 18 July 1932, Turkey was admitted to membership of the League of Nations. Mustafa Kemal’s watchword was “Peace at Home and Peace Abroad.” He was determined not to let Turkey be drawn into any risk of conflict with anybody. On the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, 29 October 1932, the Go-

vernment newspaper “Hakimiyet-i Milliye” wrote thus the Turkish friendship for the Russian Soviet Republic is rooted in Kemalism. This friendship was begun by Lenin and Mustafa Kemal and of now confirmed.

Soviet friendship was highly praised in Turkey especially after Mussolini revived the Italian designs on Anatolia. Moreover the Soviets lent Turkey technical assistance and inter-free loans. The fear of Italian aggression was referred to in the Note which Turkey sent to Great Britain in 1936, asking for revision of the Straits Convention of 1923 which forbade fortification, of the Straits. In response to this Note, the Lausanne Powers, held a Conference at Montreux, which, by the Convention of 20 July 1936, restored full Turkish Sovereignty over the Straits. The Soviet Union did not ratify the Treaty of Lausanne. But the Convention of Montreux, duly signed and ratified by the Soviet Union, had recognized Turkey’s right to fortify and defend the Straits.

II

However Turkish-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated. The Soviet support of attempts to establish a strong Communist Party in Turkey had caused considerable concern. This concern was further deepened by the Soviet demands in 1939 that Turkey sign a protocol to modify the Montreux Convention of 1939 to the effect of closing the Straits to all non-Black Sea Countries and allowing the Soviets to participate in Turkish decisions relating to these seaways.

The spring of 1939 occasioned great uneasiness in Turkey, Germany and Italy had invaded Czechoslovakia and Albania. Turkey, Great Britania and France began to open negotiations with regard to mutual declaration of guarantee. These declarations made clear before the world the attitude of the signatories towards each other and were to be complemented by treaties of alliance. The formule declaration with Great Britain was made on May 12, 1939 and with France on June 23, 1939.

2) Neemiddin SADAK, "Turkey Faces the Soviets", Foreign Affairs New York, April 1949.
Meanwhile the British and French delegations had gone to Moscow and started negotiation with the Soviet Union. Turkey firmly believed that the negotiation would be crowned with success. The declaration aligning Turkey with Great Britain and France were received with great resentment by Germany and Italy. The German radio and press levelled grave accusations and threats against Turkey. This was followed by cessation of the negotiations between Great Britain, France and Russia, and the Russo-German Pact of non-aggression was announced to a surprised world on August 24, 1939.

When the War broke out on September 1, 1939, negotiations for a treaty of alliance between Turkey, Britain and France were resumed and proceeded quickly. According to this plan Great Britain and France agreed to supply Turkey with military equipment (and that it should not be dragged into armed conflict with Russia.)

Meanwhile the Soviet Union invited Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu to Moscow with a view to concluding a treaty of alliance. Saracoğlu, informed the Soviet Union of the arrangements made with Great Britain and France, Before signing the treaty he had informed the two nations that he was going to Moscow for a talk with the Russians and that in the interest of his country’s relations with both parties, he wished to avoid the danger of hasty decision. Saracoğlu arrived at Moscow on September 25 and left on October 17, 1939. The initial negotiations continued without a hitch, but before concluding a treaty of alliance the Russians asked for certain amendments in the plan drawn up with Great Britain. Turkey asked Great Britain and France to agree with the said amendments, which they did after lengthy negotiations.

Turkey therefore felt that the conditions for a treaty with the Soviet Union were all fulfilled. But at that point the Soviet Union suggested an arrangement in its favour concerning the provisions of the Montreux Convention, a reservation regarding Germany be included, and finally stated that there would be one or two more points to be discussed. In the face of this entirely new and unexpected situation, negotiations for the treaty were interrupted, and Foreign Minister Saracoğlu left Moscow. The Turkish, British and French
treat was signed in Ankara on October 19, 1939, it became known through official speeches that the conclusion of this agreement displeased the Soviet Union.

During the occupation of France by Germans certain documents purporting to show the support of Turkey for French and British intentions directed against Russia were made public. The Germans, when they published the French documents were working zealously in a tense political atmosphere to create armed conflict between Turkey and Russia, and seeing Turkey isolated they believed that, as was the case with Rumania, she would be drawn closer to them to prevent likely Russian aggression. Turkey met these developments with calmness and tried to convince the Russians of the correctness of its policy toward them and the invalidity of the published documents. Contrary to German expectations Turkey did not show any inclination whatever to side with the Nazi Government.

The Spring of 1941 witnessed the descent of the Germans into the Balkans and the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia. Thus Turkey was surrounded on land and sea by Germany and Italy. In April 1941 Turkey had mobilized its entire (500,000) men army and concentrated its forces in Thrace and on the shores of the Aegean. After the occupation of Rumania, Soviet-German relations, which seemed to have been quiet for a period, assumed new activity during the winter 1940-41. Soviet-Bulgarian relations during the months of February and March 1941 were also active. After some Soviet Politicians had gone to Bulgaria in an official capacity, various Anti-Turkish rumors were circulated in Bulgaria, in short everything pointed to preparations for an attack on Turkey.

At this juncture the Germans made it known that they would not attack Turkey and then proposed a pact of Friendship non-aggression), Turkey declared that it would consent to this agreement on condition that the terms of the treaty of alliance with Great Britain were prejudiced. The Germans accepted this condition. Non-agression pact with Germany was negotiated in June and ratified on July 19413.

After the German attack on Soviet Union and during the various Axis campaigns in Africa, Turkey steadfastly refused to give passage to the Germans. As a guardian of the Montreux Convention, Turkey on the one hand did not allow the Italian fleet to pass from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, and on the other guarded its frontiers with all forces, against a surprise attack.

During the first years of the Second World War, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey generally were normal. The Soviets insisted on and praised Turkish neutrality. On August 10, 1941 the Soviet handed to Turkey a note (Jointly with Great Britain) assuring her of their fidelity to the Montreux Convention.

On January 1942 the Soviet Government through its ambassador in Ankara transmitted a message to the Turkish government that it was satisfied with the Turkish attitude. When, at the beginning of 1943 Winston Churchill visited Adana, he made it known that he appreciated Turkey’s position he had arrived from Casablanca after reaching a full understanding with President Roosevelt. The Germans and Italians then in control of the whole of Europe had not been able to penetrate into the Middle East. It was decided at Tehran at the end of 1943 to ask Turkey to enter the war this decision was communicated to Turkey. İnönü was invited to go to Cairo, where he discussed this subject with Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister. Turkey asked for equipment in order to be able to cope with a likely German-Bulgarian attack. A British military mission visited Ankara but found that it could not supply Turkey with the needed material.

Mr. Churchill in a speech made on 24 May 1944, criticized Turkey for her “exaggerated attitude of caution” and demand for huge supplies. But as Geoffrey Lewis put it, The Truk’s caution was understandable in that they had a first rate army by 1939 standard but had been growing obsolete as the war progressed, the defeat of the Germans in the East served only to strengthen Turkish concern about Russia's future action. Therefore they wanted more modern Turks, aircraft, self-propelled artillery and radar.

On 14 June, 1944 it was announced that Turkey had banned the passage through the Straits of the thinly disguised German naval
auxiliaries. The next day Numan Menemencioğlu, who as Foreign Minister had been primarily responsible for Turkey’s war-time policy was replaced by Fremier Şükrü Saracoğlu and later by Hasan Saka. In August 1944 Turkey after Great Britain and US demands several diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. The blackout regulation in Istanbul and the Black Sea towns were intensified when Bulgaria capitulated to the Red Army in September 1944. A joke that went the rounds in Istanbul at the time was that the Soviet Ambassador had called on the Turkish Foreign Minister to say: “there is no need for you to inconvenience your people by this black-out. When we attack, it will be in the day-time”.

On 22 February 1945 Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan with effected from March, This was in response to the decision at that only those nations which had declared war on the Axis by the latter date would be invited to take part in the inaugural Conference of the United Nations at San Francisco.

The 1925 Treaty with the USSR had been renewed for a further ten years in 1935, but on March 19, 1945 the Soviet Government gave notice that they would not renew the friendship and non-aggression pact again in the following November, when, it was due to expire, The USSR placed on the agenda of the big-three conference at Yalta in February 1945 the question of the Turkish Straits. Ever since 1841 the transit of naval vessels through the Straits has been regulated by international agreements. At Yalta Joseph Stalin declared that Montreux regime was outdated and prejudicial to the Russian position. He proposed that the Montreux Convention should be revised so that Russian warships might move freely at all times through the Straits since it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. Stalin's statement reopened a question that he had first raised with Churchill and Roosevelt at Tehran in November 1943 and in bilateral talks with Churchill in Moscow the following October. The Soviet leader than held that Japan played an even greater role than did the USSR, under the Montreux Convention, which in any case was linked to the defunct League of Nations. The instrument had been concluded

4) Goefrey LEWIS, Turkey (London, 1959), p. 120-121.
in circumstances of British-Soviet estrangement observed the Soviet leader and surely the United Kingdom would not want to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese.

Foreign Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, in talks with the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow, the late Selim Sarper, in June 1945, elaborated upon the Soviet position. The Soviet Government acknowledged that Turkey in World War II had acted with good will in defending the Straits. But a nation of 200 Million could not rely wholly on its neighbors intentions in such a matter without also considering Turkey’s military capabilities. In response to Sarper’s direct inquiry, Molotov conceded that Russia wanted bases on Turkish territory.

In the meantime Russia opened a war of nerves on the radio. In Ankara, early in July, Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu confired in US Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson “We ardently wish friendly relations with Russia and- are fully prepared to discuss the revision of the Straits Convention. The matter of passage through the Straits is of more interest to maritime powers than to us. Our concern is the safeguard of our territory. We will not accept Soviet domination”. When the Soviet representatives raised the issue again at Potsdam, in July 1945, Churchill stated that Turkey would never consent to the proposal for a Soviet bases along the Straits, and for exclusive control over the Straits regime by Russia and Turkey.

At any rate, the Western powers while supporting Turkey’s position also agreed that each of the Big three would engage in direct talks with Turkey on revising the Montreux Convention to meet present-day conditions. Consequently on August 8, 1946 the Soviets demanded that the Montreux Convention be revised in a conference attended by Turkey and the other Black Sea powers only and that the Soviet Union be associated in the defense of the Straits.

5) J.C. HUREWITZ, Russia and Turkish Straits, World Politics (July 1962), p. 605-606. Turkish Straits is 200 mile natural channel less than 80 Miles. The Bosphorus (27 km) coming from the Black Sea and the Dardanell (64 km) going to the Aegean-are true Straits, joined by the land sea (275 km - 85 km) of Marmara.
The Soviets also brought pressure indirectly through statements and articles of Soviet-Georgian and Soviet-Armenian scholars, advancing claims on Turkish territory in the Eastern Anatolian Provinces.

The Turkish Government rejected the Soviet demands and refused the drafting of an alliance of the type which had reduced several countries of central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe to the status of satellites.

"The Policy of a state depends on its geography" said Napoleon. As Maurice Duverger put it, no thinker whether conservative or liberal, Fascist or Marxist denies that politics is, in fact, dependent on geography, but there is no agreement on the degree of dependence. Conservatives tend to exaggerate the influence, progressive incline to minimize it. According to the proponents of this view, the Soviet Union is bound to seek an outlet to the Southern seas and this can be done only by securing a stronghold on the Turkish Straits. Consequently, it is argued whatever political regime and philosophy Russia may have, she cannot escape from geographical determinism, which will inevitably bring her into conflict with an independent Turkey. The renewal, in 1946 by the Soviet Union of the old Tsarist claims on the Straits was considered as evidence to prove the validity of this theory.

In March 1947 American aid to Turkey and Greece was introduced under the Truman Doctrine. The purpose of American aid was to assist Turkey and Greece in resisting Soviet threats and Communist penetrations. In 1949 the secret documents of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs were made public and a German-Soviet agreement on the Turkish straits was thus revealed. This agreement, in fact, entitled the Soviets to participate in the control of the Straits.

III

As Kemal Karpat puts it, the history of the Communist movements in Turkey and the official attitude toward it followed very closely the trend in Turko-Soviet relations. Early in 1920 Yesil Ordud (Green Army) was created by Mahmut Celal (Bayar) and other 13 deputies with Mustafa Kemal's consent. The leaders (Çerkes Ethem) of this army were influenced by socialist ideas and supported the establishment of Soviets in Turkey. Since to establish military autonomy and was opposed to the authority of Ankara Çerkes Ethem was liquidated by the Kemalists. The Halk İştirakiyim Fırkası (People’s Participation Party) established in 1920 is generally considered the political branch of the Green Army. The government abolished the party in 1921. Also in 1920 there was established illegally, another Communist Party by Arif Oruç and Salih Zeki who were against Sultan and Mustafa Kemal. This Party was related to the Third International and it published a number of newspapers, Emek (Labor) and Yeni Dünya (New World), and was abolished in 1922 in order to control Communist activities in Turkey, and please the Soviets, Mustafa Kemal had himself ordered in secret the establishment of a Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Fırkası) by some of his close associates. In the view of this party Communism was a means to serve the national welfare of the Turkish nation and Nationalism was its supreme ideal. Soon the party was denounced by the Soviets who termed it as the creation of some Turkish Pashas who intended to deceive the toiling masses.

The real Communist Party in Turkey was originally established on September 22, 1919 in Istanbul under the name of Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası (Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party) under the leadership of Şefik Hüsnü and Ethem Nejat. The Party program subscribed to Marxist-Leninist interpretation of social classes and political struggle. The Party was attached to the Third International.

Outside of Turkey the Communist movement was headed by Mustafa Suphi. In 1920 he transferred his headquarters to Baku, where he published Yeni Dünya (New World) and was a member
of the Presidium of the Eastern People’s Congress in 1920. In order
to organize Party activities Mustafa Suphi and sixteen of his Follo-
wers entered the country where they were murdered, in Trabzon
by mobs. After relations with the Soviets expanded Turkish Go-
vernment decided to liberate all the imprisoned Communists and
prosecute the murderers of Mustafa Suphi.

The Party of Şefik Hüsnü went underground in 1925, as a result
of the Takriri Süksen (Maintenance of Order) law, The underground
activities of the Party continued trought publication and secret
organizations. In the following years many groups were arrested.
Nazım Hikmet was arrested in 1932 for his revolutionary poems and
jailed again in 1938. In 1950 he was released and in 1951 escaped
to the Soviet Union where he died in the 1960’s.

The political liberalization and especially the Amendment of
the Association Law of 1946 enabled Şefik Hüsnü to re-
establish the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party (Türkiye Sosyalist
Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi) on June 19, 1946. Esat Adil Müstecaph-
oğlu, on May 14, 1946, established a Turkish Socialist Party (Türki-
kiye Sosyalist Partisi) which was inspired by Marxism, but in prac-
tice resembled the conventional socialist parties. On December 16,
1946 Şefik Hüsnü’s and Esat Adil’s Parties were closed down under
the Martial Law. The long trial of their leaders ended in 1948 Şefik
Hüsnü and fifty five others were sentenced to jail terms. Esat Adil
was acquitted and his party allowed to organize itself. In the elec-
tions in Istanbul of 1951 it could poll no more than 220 votes out
of the more than 175,000 votes cost. Between 1950-58 other Com-

IV

Turkish resistance to the postwar Soviet claims was bolstered at
the time by ashow of America naval power in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. Turkey moved in the direction of a closer Western
alliance. The Russians had misjudged the Turkish reaction and im-

8) Kemal KARPAT, Turkey’s Politics, Princeton University Press,
1959, p. 353-358.
mediately after Stalin's death in May 1953, the Soviet Government officially withdrew the demands which it had advanced in 1945.

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 followed an unilateral American offer of support to any free nations threatened by the Soviet Union and wishing to build its defenses. Because Turkey was envisioned as a substitute for Eastern Europe as a source of food and raw materials for Western Europe, Turkey became a participant in the Marshall Plan.

On 1 August 1950 Turkey formally applied for admission to the NATO. At the NATO Council meeting in September, Norway and Denmark strongly opposed the entry of Turkey and Greece. The British and French Government especially the later, were opposed to the admission of Turkey presumably because of their unwillingness to guarantee a country on Russian's doorstep, the justification being that Turkey is in no sense a North Atlantic Power. Turkey's disappointment and chagrin were all the greater since she had loyally and promptly answered the United Nations call for aid in the Korean war and over 5,000 Turkish troops disembarked at Pusan on 18 October, 1950. In August 1950, the Bulgarian Government began to deport to Turkey a quarter Million Muslims of Turkish origin many belonging to families that had been living in Bulgaria for generations. Turkey has made valiant efforts to absorb the unwilling immigrants. The Bulgarian frontier was however closed when the Bulgars across 1000 gypsies camouflaged as Turkish emigrants. On 21 February 1953 when Bulgaria agreed to take them back the frontier was reopened. The motive as Geoffrey Lewis put it, for the Bulgarian action was presumably to punish the Turks for sending their contingent to Korea; it has certainly involved the Turk in much inconvenience and expense.

On 18 February 1952 despite an initial rebuff, The Turks were admitted to full membership in the NATO thereby second a Western Commitment to come to their defence if attacked. It was only after the valiant Turkish effort in the Korean War, involving 20,000 Turks who at various times formed parts of the Turkish Brigade.

The Turkish port of Izmir became the headquarters of NATO's South East Europe Command. A Turkish-Greek-Yugoslav military
alliance was signed at Blend on 9 August in 1954. In the same year a Turkish-Pakistan Treaty (Treaty of Mutual Friendship, April 2, 1954) paved the way for the so-called Northern Tier system of defense against Russia. The key to the new combination was a Turkish alliance of 1955 with Iraq called the Baghdad Pact. Shortly after it was joined by Britain, Pakistan and Iran. The United States, which had strongly encouraged the arrangement did not join even though it became a member of the committees of the Pact at a later date.

These treaties may be interpreted in part as Turkish Democratic Administration's policy to follow the American and British lead in the "Pactomania" of the day. But, it also underlined the three basic tenets of Turkish Policy; One was the Turkish desire to preserve the status quo and to remain at peace. Another was the recognition that Russia not Communism for Yugoslavia too was Communist - represented the greatest potential threat to Turkish security. The third tenet was the desire to cultivate good relations with neighbors wherever possible.

But the Baghdad Pact also represented a Turkish departure from traditional policy of not committing itself irrevocably to any particular position in the Middle East. In taking the initiative for the Baghdad Pact which same Arabs interpreted as being a device of Western Imperialism for dividing the Arab States, it incurred the enmity of Nasser-led Arab Nationalism, for which Iraq's Nuri Said Pasa was a prime target. When a revolution in Baghdad on July 14, 1958 overthrew the Pro-Turkish Iraqi regime the Baghdad Pact lost its only Arab member. The organization after 1959 renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) removed its headquarters from Baghdad to Ankara.

During 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine pledged the United States military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern Country desirous of forestalling Communist aggression. On July 15, 1958 Turkey endorsed the US decision to land marines in the Lebanon. In fact, American paratroopers landed in Adana in southern Turkey on their way to Beirut on July 17, 1958. This concept of defending the oil-rich but unstable Middle East from Soviet attack and Communist penetration known as "the Northern Tier Policy" was developed by the then Secretary of States John Foster Dulles and was considered
a further development of the Truman Doctrine. Despite a series of Soviet notes to Turkey starting July 25, 1958 threatening the country and insisting on the removal of American bases in Turkey, the Turkish Government was not intimidated.

V

Immediately after Stalin’s death the Soviet Government officially withdrew on 30 May 1953 which it had advanced in 1945 and other Communist Countries moved steadily toward winning over Turkish Governments rather than undermining them. Soon afterwards came offers of Soviet technical and financial aid for industrial development. At first Turkey turned a deaf ear to these proposals; but in 1960 Menderes, the then Turkish Prime Minister decided to visit Moscow. However, he was overthrown, on 27 May 1960, by the Army and it was left to his successors to take the first tentative steps in securing normal relations with the Northern Neighbour.

Even the Strongly pro-Western Justice Party Government, formed in 1965 by Süleyman Demirel, did not prevent the emergence of a new look in Turkish foreign policy. This new look could justly be described as one of greater independence. The Turkish Government, while maintaining the NATO alliance and close military and economic connections with US had begun to follow a somewhat more independent line in foreign policy. This was especially the result of the subceeding of the Cold War and the search for a “détente”. All Turkish Governments had naturally put Turkish interests first Mustafa Kemal’s decision to make use of Soviet help in 1920’s, his subsequent rapprochement with the West, the treaties of Alliance with Britain and France, the nonagression treaty with Nazi Germany, İnönü’s grateful acceptance of the Truman Doctrine and the decision of Menderes to fight in Korea and to seek membership of NATO, the careful steps to test intentions of Stalins successors were move inspired not by quixotic impulses but by sober

(*) Turkish - Iraqi mutual defense Pact (Baghdat Pact) was signed on February 24, 2955 ratified by Turkey on February 26 and become operative April 15. On March 1, 1955 Moscow Radio declared that the Baghdad Pact was a “stab in the back of all Arab Nations".
calculations on national interests. There were of course shifts of emphasis in the appraisal of the national interests. There were also mistakes.

The new line in Turkish foreign policy was more responsive to Soviet gestures which became softer than at any time since the 1930's. In 1964 and 1965 Turkish and Soviet Parliamentary delegations exchanged visits. At the end of 1964, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin visited Moscow—the first such visit since the ill-fated trip saracoğlu in 1959—and Gromyko paid a return visit in 1965. (See F. C. Erkin penfire p. 493-463).

A Russo-Turkish trade agreement was concluded in 1964 and supplemented in 1965 and 1967. Russian loans and advise on some industrial projects were accepted. A major development was an agreement in March 1968 under which the Russians are to build factories throughout Turkey worth $200 Million. The plants are to begin production in 1972. The year American economic aid to Turkey is expected to end. The Turkish Prime Minister, Ürquiplü, visited Moscow in 1965 and Soviet Premier Kosigin was in Ankara in 1966 then Turkish Premier Demirel visited the Soviet Union in September 1967. From these exchanges the Turks gained modest Russian diplomatic support for their stand on Cyprus.

But Turkey still know that Soviet bloc arms went to Makarios and therefore wanted American friendship and support. Even, Turkey's foreign policy was being given a healthy re-examination.

Turkish foreign policy continues to be determined by the basic of the international position rather than by changing moods of international politics. The basic fact is awareness based on experience of old and familiar Russian expansionism and therefore a desire to seek or accept Western-American support.

We cannot close our general and descriptive remarks without a word on Turkey's probable course of action in the future. To raise the subject at all may seem surprising, in face of all that we have said about Turkey's strong ties with the West and the long standing enmity between Turkey and Russia. But it must be remembered that the existence of the 1038 Treaty with France and Britain did not prevent Turkey from remaining neutral. As Richard D. Ro-
binson put it; the Turks have been past masters at diplomacy. A notable exception was Turkey’s entry into World War I, on the wrong side, an act inspired by Enver Pasa, who was in control of the Ottoman Empire when the war erupted. But generally, The Turkish diplomats were known for in their flexibility, realism and hard-headed pursuit of vital national interests. Their efforts witness their decision to remain a non-belligerant in World War II until the last possible moment, February 28, 1945, thereby gaining the right to become a charter member of the UN. Despite Turkey’s tradition of diplomatic manœuvring the Soviet gestures forced the Turks into a firm commitment to the Western Powers. Not only did the Turkey need the military support of the West, it also needed economic aid, the Turks realized full well that their first line of defense against Communist penetration was not the army, but rather sustained economic and social development.9

Membership in NATO, participation in the Korean War, and support of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East all followed from this necessity of identifying Turkey with the West. The Cold War brought about a coincidence of interest between Turkey and the United States. But one cannot reasonably expect that such will always be the case. As R.D. Robinson puts it, what if the Turkish leaders come to feel that the old conditions no longer prevailed?

That does not block the realization of any vital Soviet interest. Possession of the Straits is no longer of vital concern (it is clear that Soviet vessels may move through freely in time of peace.) Or that Turkey would not be an initial target of Soviet aggression if it did not become a major missile-launching platform.

Turkey lies directly at the center of an area of great conflict. The Straits is the only seaway linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and the Soviet Union is the major Black Sea and an emergent Mediterranean Power. So-called routine cruise of two American destroyers in the Black Sea in the fall of 1968, the Turks recalled that the Caucus Belli of Turkey’s participation in World War I, was two German warships—Coeben and Breslau—which, under

the order of the German Commander Admiral Souchon, bombarded the Russian Black Sea Ports. The maintenance of peace in this part of the World is of vital importance to the Turks, for they realize that in any major conflict Turkey might well become one of the initial battlefields. In September 1963 the Soviet Union asked Turkey to bar the William V. Pratt, an American destroyer equipped with ASROC 205 mm anti-submarine weapons which can carry nuclear warheads, from passing through the Bosphorus. Turkey agreed to observe the Montreux Convention and the visit of the pratt was cancelled. Official relations with the US remain cordial but public resentment provoked by radicals and extremist to the American military presence in Turkey spur some hostile demonstrations. After mutual agreement Americans began a gradual withdrawal from their military bases which Turkey is taking over to operate under NATO. The Korean War, has demonstrated capacity of Turkish fighting men and they would make any invader of their country pay a heavy price for his temerity. but if the potential aggressor has the sense to guarantee Turkey's territorial integrity, the possibility exists that Turks might find it politic to revive Atatürk's slogan of "Peace at home and Peace abroad" even though they are unlikely to return to his policy of "positive friendship" with the Soviets.

An article in 1969 published in the Soviet monthly journal of political analysis—International Affairs—states that "Steady progress in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey has been registered in the last years", but that "the normalisation of relations are not to the liking of the NATO leaders. Turkey is on the Southern flank of the bloc, and the NATO leadership still places great hopes in her" "What deep-lying causes impel Turkey, while remaining a member of NATO, to effect a rapprochement with her Northern neighbour?" asks the writer, and answers "in particular the new political tendencies are greatly influenced by economic factors."

(*) On September 15, 1953 Soviet–Turkish Agreement signed no the Serrarakat Dam on the frontier near Igdir, ended 15 year dispute over Turkey's share of the cost preventing it from profiting from the dam.

10) G. NIKOLAYEV, "Soviet–Turkish Relations", International Affairs (November 1969), Moscow, p. 31-40.